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In her book, Horne develops a theory of norm enforcement. Norms are funda-
mental to explain social order. Norm enforcement has been studied in many
ways in the social sciences. However, Horne adds a truly unique approach. She
links norm enforcement with social interdependence by asking how norm enfor-
cement relates to the social relations people have with each other. She deﬁnes in-
terdependence as the extent to which people value their relations and the goods
they can receive through relations with others. The book claims that the more
interdependent people are, the more likely they sanction norm violations. This is
similar to Coleman’s claim that closed networks are essential for the realization
of norms (1990, Chapter 11). Horne discusses norm and meta-norm enforcement,
with multiple real world examples, and examines enforcement with laboratory
experiments.
Before Horne introduces her own theoretical approach to explain norm en-
forcement she discusses various theoretical approaches, namely the consequen-
tialist approach, the shared-meanings approach, and the typicality approach.
The consequentialist approach claims that the smaller the costs and the lar-
ger the beneﬁts of norm compliance, the more likely people enforce norms. The
shared-meanings account merely claims that people agree on a particular be-
havior that they then all follow. The last approach, the typicality approach, is
based on the assumption that individuals imitate the behavior of others due to
normative pressure created by the desire to follow the majority. Horne nicely
shows the limitations of each of the three approaches with respect to explaining
norm and meta-norm enforcement. In order to give a more satisfactory account,
Horne develops a relational theory of norm enforcement. The main point of the
relational approach is that people not only sanction in response to bad behavior,
they also sanction because they care what people think of them. People sanction
others because they want to look good to others and not just because of future
consequences of others’ deviant behavior. The book covers some very import-
ant questions related to norm enforcement, and it gives interesting theoretical
answers by linking norm enforcement with the relationships among individu-
als who either do or do not enforce social norms. What makes her approach so6 Sonja Vogt
interesting is that she does not study norm enforcement in terms of promised
rewards and threatened punishment. Rather, she studies norm enforcement in
terms of actual rewards and real punishment. In spite of this, however, a more
thorough discussion of how her contribution relates to the existing literature on
punishment and pro-social behavior (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2002) would have
made her analysis more accessible.
Horne tests her theoretical claims with experimental data. To test her theo-
ry she develops the Norms Game, the Metanorms Game, and the Expectations
Game. Most of her hypotheses are seemingly conﬁrmed. However, the empirical
ﬁndings are often difﬁcult to interpret. The Norms Game tests whether “people
impose harsher punishments against behavior that produces greater harm and
whether this tendency is enhanced when group members are interdependent”
(28). In the Norms Game subjects interacted with each other in groups of four for
48 rounds. They made decisions about donating to a group project. Each round
contained four stages. In the ﬁrst stage every subject received an income of 30
points. In the second stage, one randomly chosen subject decided whether or not
to donate 20 points to the group and as a consequence everybody, including the
donating subject, received a certain amount of points. In the third stage subjects
had the opportunity to give points to each other. In the ﬁnal stage, each subject
received her points in her account, and the game proceeded to the next round.
The experiment contained two main treatment variations in a 2x2 design, na-
mely the consequences of donating points in the second stage were either low or
high, and the interdependence among subjects in the third stage was either low
or high. In the consequences dimension, subjects either received 2 or 6 points
given one member of the group donated 20 points in the second stage. Thus, the
treatment difference was the difference in the points subjects received after a
donation happened. In the interdependence dimension, Horne manipulated the
way the points were exchanged between subjects in stage three. In the high de-
pendency case, the experimenter doubled the points exchanged among subjects.
If player W gave away 10 points to player Y, player Y actually received 20 points.
In the low interdependence case, points were exchanged, but the experimenter
did not double them.
Interdependence was manipulated in a way such that the low interdepen-
dence treatment resulted in no efﬁciency gains or losses. The high interdepen-
dence treatment, in contract, produced efﬁciency gains because the exchanged
points were doubled and therefore new money entered the experiment; it was ef-
ﬁcient to exchange. It is therefore not clear whether it was the interdependence
among subjects or the differences in efﬁciency that caused peoples’ behavior to
change. It has been shown in several studies that some people are motivated
by efﬁciency gains (e.g. Charness and Rabin 2002). Efﬁciency motives and re-
lational motives can both affect subject behavior in Horne’s experiment based
on the Norm Game. If the motivation of the behavior in the second stage is not
clear, one has to be careful with the interpretation of the results. Even though
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subjects who donated in the second stage, the effects of interdependence can-
not be isolated if they are confounded with efﬁciency.
Efﬁciency concerns also complicate the interpretation of effects associated
with the consequences dimension. In the low consequence treatment, subjects
suffered a small efﬁciency loss when donating money (20 points donated, but
only 8 points received by the group in total). In the high consequence treatment,
subjects had a small efﬁciency gain (20 points donated, and 24 points received by
the group in total). In other words, donating money in the low consequence treat-
ment burned money, while donating money in the high consequence treatment
created money. In the low consequence treatment, donating points was framed
as a donation to the group, but in reality it resulted in both a cost to the donator
and an efﬁciency loss for the group. Thus, it is not clear whether donating was
really prosocial. In the high consequence treatment, donating was costly for the
individual, but it produced an efﬁciency gain. Again, the design does not allow
to disentangle efﬁciency motives from prosocial motives.
A more general point regarding the design of the Norms Game is the ass-
umption that behavior in the third stage of the game was related to behavior in
the second stage. It would be important to provide clear evidence for this with a
manipulation check on showing the link between donation and exchange.
Horne does a similar study focusing on meta-norm enforcement rather than
norm-enforcement. Meta-norms are deﬁned as second-order norms that regulate
the sanctioning process of norm violations. In line with the norm enforcement
study beforehand, Horne predicts that meta-norm enforcement is more likely the
more interdependent the people are. Horne tests her prediction by developing a
Metanorms Game. Subjects were in groups of ﬁve. One of them was randomly
assigned to a situation where a thief stole something. The victim could then
decide to punish the thief. Punishing was costly for the victim, but at the same
time it beneﬁted the others in the group. After the victim decided whether or
not to punish, all subjects in the group could exchange points as described in the
Norms Game above. In the high interdependence treatment the experimenter
tripled exchanged points and in the low interdependence treatment points were
kept constant. In addition to interdependence, Horne manipulated the presence
or absence of indirect sanctioning beneﬁts. The points subjects received if a thief
was punished were either used in the game for exchange (indirect beneﬁt), or
they were locked up and paid at the end of the game (direct beneﬁt). Horne’s
predictions were conﬁrmed, but again, as in the Norms Game, interpreting the
results is not always straightforward because interdependence and efﬁciency
are confounded.
The most innovative chapter of Horne’s book is about expectations and meta-
norm enforcement. In a nutshell, Horne claims that people often sanction be-
havior, even when the behavior does not harm anybody, simply because the be-
havior is non-conformist. A classical example she gives is fashion. She explains
punishing atypical behavior by arguing that people believe the punishment of
deviations, even if deviations are costless, will be seen favorably by others. This
is a very interesting claim and Horne tests it with the Expectation Game she8 Sonja Vogt
developed. The Expectation Game is a variant of the classic Asch (1951) experi-
ment. In Horne’s version, the actors chose between two letters, X and W. Each
subject was in a group with seven simulated actors. Real subjects were not told
that the other subjects were simulated. After six of the simulated actors made a
choice that was actually programmed (either all chose X or W), the real subject
had to make a choice. The simulated actor who then followed the real subject
made a choice that differed from the formerly simulated choices. Then the real
subject had the opportunity to punish the deviant simulated subject by giving
more points to those who conformed with the majority relative to those who did
not. Horne hypothesized that real subjects who conformed to the majority deci-
sion would punish those sequent choices that deviated. Interestingly, Horne did
not ﬁnd her predicted effect initially. Only when she gave some kind of meaning
to the behavioral choices did she get the predicted effects. In this case, the real
subject was told that choosing X or W was related to the number of friends the
simulated subjects had. This is an interesting, though unexplained result, and
it would be useful to study the reason for the framing effect.
In the ﬁnal chapters of the book, Horne argues that her theory applies to a
range of norm enforcing behaviors outside the laboratory. It is important to vali-
date laboratory ﬁndings with empirical tests outside the experimental laborato-
ry, and norm enforcement is a potentially rich topic for connecting experimental
work with survey data. Horne discusses examples associated with human rights,
deviant behavior, and norm enforcement in neighborhoods. Altogether, The Re-
wards of Punishment makes an interesting contribution to the study of norm
enforcement. Horne introduces refreshing ideas by studying the effects of social
relations on norm enforcement and meta-norm enforcement.
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